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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-COPYRIGHT ACT-COPYRIGHT IN-
FRINGEMENT-ATrORNEY'S FEES-The United States Supreme
Court held that attorney's fees are to be awarded to the prevail-
ing party only at the discretion of the court, and that prevailing
plaintiffs and prevailing defendants should be treated the same.
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994).
In 1970, Petitioner John C. Fogerty ("Fogerty"), a successful
musician and songwriter,' wrote and copyrighted a song entitled
"Run Through the Jungle."2 The exclusive publishing rights of
the song were obtained by Fantasy, Inc. ("Fantasy").' In 1985,
Fogerty published and copyrighted a song entitled "Old Man
Down the Road," which was released and distributed by Warner
Brother Records, Inc.4 Respondent Fantasy sued Fogerty and
Warner Brother Records, Inc..in federal district court for copy-
right infringement, alleging that Fogerty's new song, "The Old
Man Down the Road," was musically identical to that of "Run
Through the Jungle."6 After a jury trial, a verdict in favor of
Fogerty was returned.' Fogerty then moved for an award of
1. John Fogerty was the lead singer and songwriter of the group "Creedence
Clearwater Revival" in the 1960s. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1026
(1994). "Creedence Clearwater Revival' was known for its distinctive "swamp rock"
style of music. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1026 n.2.
2. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1026.
3. Id. Fantasy obtained, by assignment, the "Run Through the Jungle" copy-
right from its predecessors in interest who had purchased the exclusive publishing
rights from Fogerty. Id. Fantasy's predecessors in interest include Fantasy/Galaxy
Records and Argosy Venture which used various business names including "Jondora
Music," 'Cireco," "Galaxy," and 'Debut of California." Petitioner's Brief at 5 n.5,
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994) (No. 92-1750).
4. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1026.
5. Id. Besides Warner Brother Records, Inc., the following were also named
as defendants in Fantasy's copyright infringement suit: WEA International, Inc.,
WEA Manufacturing, Inc., Warner-Elektra-Atlantic Corporation, and Warner Commu-
nications, Inc. (collectively referred to as the "Warner Defendants"). Petitioner's Brief,
cited at note 3, at i. John Fogerty indemnified and reimbursed the Warner Defen-
dants for their costs and attorney's fees incurred in the suit because of an agree-
ment with the Warner Defendants. Id. at 4 n.3.
6. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1026. The district court denied defendant Warner
Brother Records' motion for summary judgment ruling that a copyright owner could
infringe the exclusive rights that he had granted to another. Fantasy, Inc. v.
Fogerty, 654 F. Supp. 1129, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 1987), affd, 984 F.2d 1524 (9th Cir.
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reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to the Copyright Act of
1976.' The district court, following Ninth Circuit precedent,.
denied the motion because Fantasy's infringement suit was not
frivolous or in bad faith.8 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the decision refusing to abandon their dual
standard!
To resolve the conflict between the dual standard followed by
the Ninth, Second, Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits,
and the evenhanded standard followed by the Third, Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari." The
Supreme Court also addressed Fogerty's contention that pursu-
ant to the neutral language of Section 505 of the Copyright Act
of 1976 both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should auto-
matically be awarded attorney's fees, unless there were excep-
tional circumstances.1 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the
opinion of the Court which rejected both the dual standard fol-
lowed by the Ninth Circuit and Petitioner Fogerty's claim that
attorney's fees should be awarded automatically to the prevail-
ing party in a copyright infringement suit. 2
Three arguments were advanced by Fantasy in favor of the
dual standard for awarding attorney's fees in copyright infringe-
ment suits.'3 First, Fantasy contended that the language of
Section 505 was similar to a provision of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964's and that in Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994).
7. Fogerty, 114 S.Ct. at 1026. The Copyright Act provides that:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the
recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or
an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may
also- award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the
costs.
17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988).
8. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1532 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 1023 (1994). The district court held that even though Fogerty wrote the original
song he could be liable for copyright infringement. Fantasy, 654 F. Supp. at 1131.
9. Fantasy, 984 F.2d at 1533. The Ninth Circuit's standard generally allowed
an award of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs as a matter of course, while pre-
vailing defendants were required to show that the suit brought against them was
frivolous or in bad faith. Id. at 1532. In contrast, other circuits followed an even-
handed standard, whereby prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants were held
to the same standard which did not require a showing of bad faith. Fogerty, 114 S.
Ct. at 1027 n.8.
10. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1027. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2992
(1993) (granting certiorari).
11. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1033.
12. Id. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and
Ginsburg joined in the opinion. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment. Id. at 1025.
13. Id. at 1027.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. 1993). Title VII states, in part, that,
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EEOC, 5 the Court's interpretation of the language of Title VII
supported a differentiation in the treatment of prevailing plain-
tiffs and defendants.' Fantasy further argued that in Flight
Attendants v. Zipes,"7 the Court reasoned that similar language
in fee-shifting statutes was a strong indication that an analo-
gous interpretation of the statutes would be necessary."
The Court rejected this argument because the factors present
in Christiansburg were not present in a case of copyright in-
fringement."9 The Court reasoned that the goals, the policy ob-
jectives of the Civil Rights Act, and the intent of Congress to
achieve those objectives by using plaintiffs as private attorneys
general differed from those of the Copyright Act which sought to
stimulate artistic creativity.'m The Court pointed out that
through the passage of the Civil Rights Act, Congress sought to
encourage private enforcement by providing for the private at-
torney general plaintiff who could not afford to litigate his
claims against defendants with greater resources.2 The Court
contrasted this with the objective of the Copyright Act which
was to enrich the general public through the encouragement of
original authorship of literary, artistic and musical expres-
sion.' Furthermore, the Court asserted that in copyright in-
fringement cases both plaintiffs and defendants could be either
corporate giants or struggling artists, and should be treated
equally.' The Court noted that the fee shifting provisions of
the federal patent and trademark statutes' supported an even-
handed standard with similar language to the Copyright Act,
but only awarded attorney's fees in exceptional cases.'
"the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable
attorney's fee . . . as part of the costs." Id.
15. 434 U.S. 412 (1978). The Court decided that a prevailing plaintiff in a
Title VII case would be awarded attorney's fees in all but exceptional circumstances,
while a prevailing defendant had to show that the plaintiffs claim was frivolous, un-
reasonable or without merit. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
16. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1027-28.
17. 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
18. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1028 (citing Zipes, 491 U.S. at 758 n.2).
19. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1028.
20. Id.
21. Id. The Court noted that the plaintiff was the means that Congress had
selected to enforce its civil rights policy objectives. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The federal patent and trademark statutes regulate subject matter that is
analogous to the subject matter regulated by the copyright statute. Fogerty, 114 S.
Ct. at 1028-29 n.12.
25. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1028. The Patent Act states that "the court in ex-
ceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." 35
U.S.C. § 285 (1988). See also Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1988).
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Fantasy's second argument was that the dual standard fur-
thered the objectives of the Copyright Act by encouraging litiga-
tion of claims of copyright infringement as a deterrent to such
infringement.' The Court rejected this argument, reasoning
that discouraging infringement was not the only objective of the
Copyright Act.' The Court pointed out that both plaintiffs and
defendants in a copyright infringement suit could hold copy-
rights." Additionally, the Court noted that a successful defense
in a copyright infringement suit could further artistic creativity
for the good of the public just as much as a successful prosecu-
tion of a copyright infringement claim by a copyright owner.'
Therefore, the Court opined that defendants who wanted to
advance copyright infringement defenses should be encouraged
to do so to the same extent that copyright owners were encour-
aged to litigate infringement claims."
Fantasy's final argument was that the legislative history ex-
hibited a congressional ratification of the dual standard by
adopting the nearly identical language of the Copyright Act of
1909"' knowing that the lower courts uniformly followed this
dual standard. 2 Fantasy also claimed that two copyright office
studies, the Strauss Study' and the Brown Study,3 submitted
to Congress when studying revisions to the 1909 Copyright Act,
purported to inform Congress of the well-established dual stan-
26. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1029. The Ninth Circuit had previously expressed
such an opinion. See McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc., 923 F.2d 316, 323 (9th Cir.
1987). The Court reasoned that "[b]ecause § 505 is intended in part to encourage the
assertion of colorable copyright claims, to deter infringement, and to make the
plaintiff whole, fees are generally awarded to the prevailing plaintiff." Fogerty, 114
S. Ct. at 1029 (quoting McCulloch, 923 F.2d at 323).
27. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1029. The Court noted that the Act also seeks to
encourage artistic creativity. Id. Congress has been granted the power "[tlo promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
28. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1029.
29. Id. at 1030.
30. Id.
31. Ch. 320, § 40, 35 Stat. 349 (1909) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1976),
current version at 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988)).
32. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1030. "Congress is presumed to be aware of an
administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation
when it re-enacts a statute without change . I..." d. (quoting Lorilard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 580 (1978)).
33. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1030 (citing Strauss, The Damage Provisions of the
Copyright Law, Copyright Office Study No. 22, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960)).
34. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1030 (citing Brown, Ralph S. Jr., The Operation of
the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, Copyright Of-
fice Study No. 23, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960)).
dard.'
The Court rejected Fantasy's argument after reviewing the
prior case law and concluded that there was no settled dual
standard interpretation of Section 40 of the Copyright Act of
1909, and therefore, Congress could not have been aware of a
dual standard.' Additionally, the Court concluded that neither
the Strauss Study nor the Brown Study endorsed a dual stan-
dard of interpretation. 7
In contrast, the Petitioner argued that because of the neutral
language of Section 505 of the Copyright Act of 1976 both pre-
vailing plaintiffs and defendants should have an automatic
award of attorney's fees, barring exceptional circumstances."
The Court rejected this contention for two reasons."9 First, the
opinion noted that the plain language of Section 505 required
the trial court to use discretion, because Section 505 stated that
the court may award reasonable attorney's fees."0 An automatic
award, the Court reasoned, would remove a court's discretion.41
Second, the American Rule, which was generally followed by
Congress, required that parties had to bear the cost of their own
attorney's fees unless Congress had provided to the contrary.42
Finally, the Supreme Court noted that no court had held that
Section 505 of the Copyright Act adopted the British Rule.'
Consequently, the Court held that both prevailing plaintiffs
and prevailing defendants should be treated the same and that
attorney's fees were to be awarded to the prevailing party only
at the discretion of the court." The decision of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit was reversed and remanded.'
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with
the analysis in Christiansburg Garment Co. and the Court's use
of that analysis to interpret the Copyright Act's language.' He
asserted that the result of the Court's analysis produced differ-
ent interpretations, despite the fact that Section 505 of the
Copyright Act of 1976 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
35. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1030.
36. Id. at 1032.
37. Id. at 1031.
38. Id. at 1033. The Court noted that this practice was called the British
Rule. Id.
39. Id.





45. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1033.
46. Id. at 1033-34 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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1964 had virtually identical language. 7
The concurrence noted that, in this case, the Court embraced
a plain language interpretation, while in Christiansburg it re-
jected a plain language interpretation as mechanical and unten-
able, and relied instead on equitable considerations of the
statute's policies and legislative history." Justice Thomas em-
phasized that such an approach was inconsistent and created an
uncertainty in the law.4 Additionally, the concurring opinion
asserted that the majority's reasoning that application of a plain
meaning approach should be dependent on the statute's policy
objectives and legislative history was mistaken.' Justice Thom-
as opined that even though Christiansburg mistakenly disre-
garded statutory language to take into account equitable consid-
erations, stare decisis precluded overruling this questionable
precedent."1 Accordingly, Justice Thomas asserted that he
would refuse to use the Christiansburg analysis in the future.'
He concluded that the majority's plain meaning interpretation of
Section 505 was appropriate.'
The American Rule followed by the courts and Congress re-
quired parties to pay their own attorney's fees unless Congress
provided a statutory provision to the contrary." The first case
to present this issue to the Supreme Court was Arcambel v.
Wiseman' in which the Court disallowed an award of $1,600
for attorney's fees."
In 1872, the Court addressed this issue more thoroughly in
Oelrichs v. Spain,7 and disallowed the award of attorney's
fees." In Oelrichs, a lien was placed on the proceeds of
47. Id. at 1034. See note 7 for text of Section 505 and note 14 for text of
Section 2000e-5(k).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1035.




54. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1023.
55. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796). The details of the case were not discussed in
the opinion.
56. Arcambel, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 306. The Court held:
We do not think that this charge ought to be allowed. The general practice of
the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that practice were not
strictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is
changed, or modified, by statute.
Id.
57. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872).
58. OeIrichs, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 230.
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bonds.5" The trial court assessed damages and attorney's fees
against the defendant.' The Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's decision, but disagreed with the trial court's award of
attorney's fees."1 The Court held that attorney's fees were not
allowable, relying on Arcambel.62 The Oelrichs Court asserted
that in debt, contract and assumpsit actions, attorney's fees
were never included in the damages; therefore, they should not
be awarded in equity cases.' The Court noted that even though
damage awards might indirectly compensate a plaintiff for his
attorney's fees, the fees could not be used as an element of the
damage award."
Congress made a provision for an award of attorney's fees in
the Copyright Act of 1909.' In Vernon v. Sam S. & Lee
Shubert, Inc.,' the District Court for the Southern District of
New York denied a prevailing defendant attorney's fees because
the infringement suit was brought in good faith. 7 The plaintiff
sent an unsolicited manuscript of his copyrighted play to
defendant's stage director.' The defendant, who had not read
the plaintiffs play, wrote a similar play which the plaintiff as-
sumed had been copied from his own play." The issue before
the court was whether the defendant had first read the
plaintiffs play or had acted independently when he wrote his
own similar play.7"
The court ruled that there was no infringement, and then held
that because it was reasonable for the plaintiff to believe that
his copyright had been infringed, the plaintiffs suit was brought
in good faith.71 As a result, the court concluded that no costs
should be awarded against the plaintiff.
2
59. Id. at 226-27.
60. Id. at 227.
61. Id. at 230.
62. Id.
63. Oelrichs, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) at 231.
64. Id. at 230-31.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988)). Section
116 stated, "[i]n all actions, suits, or proceedings under this title, except when
brought by or against the United States or any officer thereof, full costs shall be
allowed, and the court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable attorneys fee
as part of the costs." Id.
66. 220 F. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
67. Vernon, 220 F. at 696.
68. Id. at 695.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. ld. at 696.
72. Vernon, 220 F. at 696.
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Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc.,"3 involved a copyright infringement
question which was resolved in favor of the defendant. 4 The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's
copyrighted song "Wedding Dance Waltz" with the defendant's
composition "Swanee River Moon."' 5 The district court dis-
missed the plaintiff's complaint with costs and awarded a $1,500
attorney's fee.7" The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision." The court reasoned that
the general rule detailed in Arcambel was still followed, but that
Congress in the Copyright Act of 1909 had provided for an
award of attorney's fees by the courts at their discretion.78 The
circuit court then concluded that the language of the statute
allowed the prevailing party to recover costs as a matter of
right, but left the award of attorney's fees, as part of the costs,
to the discretion of the court. 9
In 1947, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held, in
Official Aviation Guide Co. v. American Aviation Associates,
Inc.," that the prevailing defendant in a copyright infringe-
ment suit should be awarded ordinary costs, but that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees as
part of those costs."1 In Official Aviation Guide, the plaintiff
had alleged infringement by the defendant of five copyrights. 2
The Seventh Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court
and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the com-
plaint."
The district court dismissed the complaint and denied the
defendant's subsequent motion praying for costs and attorney's
fees; the defendant appealed.8' The Seventh Circuit opined that
the Copyright Act of 1909 required a mandatory award of ordi-
nary costs to a prevailing party, and also noted that the Act
made the award of attorney's -fees discretionary." The court
73. 8 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1925).
74. Marks, 8 F.2d at 460.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The circuit court did lower the attorney's fees award from $1,500 to
$500 because it thought that the district court had 'inadvertently committed an
error in judgment." Id. at 461.
78. Id.
79. Marks, 8 F.2d at 461.
80. 162 F.2d 541 (7th Cir. 1947).
81. Official Aviation Guide, 162 F.2d at 543.
82. Id. at 542. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and issued a
permanent injunction. Id.
83. Id.




reasoned that because the case was not brought in bad faith and
involved a complicated question of law, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying an award of attorney's fees to the
prevailing defendant.'
The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Overman v. Loesser,87 when it denied the award of
attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant." The circuit court
refused to overturn a finding that the defendant had not copied
the plaintiff's song.8 The court asserted, using language simi-
lar to the Seventh Circuit's, that because the case was hard
fought, brought in good faith and presented a complex problem
of law, an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant
should be denied.*
In Breffort v. I Had A Ball Co.," the District Court for the
Southern District of New York crystallized the dual standard.
The plaintiffs, owners of a copyrighted play, sued the author and
producer of the infringing musical play and the writers of the
songs and lyrics used in the infringing play.' The court ruled
in favor of the plaintiffs against the producer and writer of the
infringing play, and in favor of the song writer defendants.93
The court then approved an award of attorney's fees to be paid
by the losing defendants, the producer and the writer, but de-
nied attorney's fees to the prevailing defendants, the song writ-
ers.
94
The district court held that prevailing plaintiffs and defen-
dants should be treated differently as to the awarding of
attorney's fees.95 The opinion reasoned that the purpose of
awarding attorney's fees to a plaintiff was to deter copyright
infringement, whereas the purpose of granting an award to a
prevailing defendant was to impose a penalty on the plaintiff for
bringing a suit that was in bad faith, unreasonable or frivo-
lous.' Because the plaintiffs case did not fall into one of these
categories, the court denied the request for attorney's fees to the
prevailing defendants. 7
86. Official Aviation Guide, 162 F.2d at 543.
87. 205 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1953).
88. Overman, 205 F.2d at 524.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 271 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
92. Breffort, 271 F. Supp. at 625-26.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 627-28.
95. Id. at 627.
96. Id.
97. Breffort, 271 F. Supp. at 628-29.
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In Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp.," the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed a district court's use of a dual standard similar to
Breffort. Diamond involved an appeal from the district court's
grant of summary judgment" dismissing the plaintiffs claim
of copyright infringement and from the award of attorney's fees
to the prevailing defendants."'1 The plaintiff alleged copyright
infringement because the defendants had wrongfully appropriat-
ed the plaintiffs copyrighted letter to the editor by publishing a
substantial excerpt when the plaintiff had given permission to
publish the letter only in its entirety.' 2 The circuit court rea-
soned that because the intent of Section 505 of the Copyright
Act of 1976 was to foster the filing of colorable claims and to
discourage infringement, prevailing plaintiffs were generally
awarded attorney's fees.'03 The court opined that an award to
prevailing defendants would deter plaintiffs from bringing color-
able claims." 4 The court suggested that because the award of
attorney's fees was based on a statute, a finding of bad faith was
not necessary for an award of those fees."' The court conclud-
ed that the district court did not abuse its discretion by award-
ing attorney's fees to the defendant because the plaintiffs copy-
right infringement claims were without a reasonable legal ba-
sis."o
Cooling Systems and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator,
Inc.,"° and McCulloch v. Albert E. Price, Inc.,"° shaped the
Ninth Circuit's version of the dual standard. In Cooling Systems,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had infringed the
plaintiffs copyright by publishing a radiator catalog that was
similar to the plaintiffs catalog." The district court dismissed
the plaintiffs suit and awarded the defendant attorney's
98. 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984).
99. Diamond, 745 F.2d at 148.
100. Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The [summary] judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a mater of law.
FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c).
101. Diamond, 745 F.2d at 143.
102. Id. at 14546.
103. Id. at 148.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Diamond, 745 F.2d at 149.
107. 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985).
108. 823 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1987).
109. Cooling Systems, 777 F.2d at 487.
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fees. " ' The circuit court ruled that an award of Section 505
attorney's fees to a prevailing party required a finding of bad
faith or frivolity."' The court held that even though the dis-
trict court did not make a specific finding of bad faith or frivoli-
ty, there were sufficient indicia in the record to justify the dis-
trict court's discretionary award of attorney's fees to the defen-
dants."'
In McCulloch, the circuit court considered an appeal by the
defendant of a copyright infringement judgment awarding dam-
ages and attorney's fees to the plaintiff.' The plaintiff claimed
copyright infringement because the defendant had made and
sold copies of the defendant's copyrighted decorative plate."4
The district court held that the defendant had infringed
plaintiffs copyright, and therefore enjoined defendant from fur-
ther sales of the infringing plate and also awarded the plaintiff
attorney's fees." 5 The defendant claimed that the district court
did not make a finding of bad faith or frivolity and therefore
abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to the plain-
tiff."' The circuit court distinguished McCulloch from Cooling
Systems by pointing out that Cooling Systems involved a prevail-
ing defendant while McCulloch involved a prevailing plain-
tiff."7 The court held that for a grant of attorney's fees to a
prevailing plaintiff, a finding of bad faith or frivolity was not re-
quired.
118
In Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., the District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected the dual stan-
dard and adopted an evenhanded approach. The issue in Cohen
was whether the defendant should be awarded Section 505
attorney's fees after the court allowed the plaintiff to withdraw
its copyright infringement complaint."2 The court ruled that
the defendant was the prevailing party and therefore awarded
attorney's fees.' The plaintiff argued that a prevailing defen-
110. Id. at 486-87.
111. Id. at 493.
112. Id. at 493-94.
113. McCulloch, 823 F.2d at 318.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 322.
117. Id.
118. McCulloch, 823 F.2d at 322.
119. 617 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Va. 1985), affd on other grounds, 788 F.2d 247
(4th Cir. 1986), reu'd in part, affd in part, Nos. 86-1164, 86-1169, 1987 WL 37512
(4th Cir. May 26, 1987).
120. Cohen, 617 F. Supp. at 620.
121. Id. at 623.
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dant should only be entitled to attorney's fees if there was a
finding that the plaintiff's case was frivolous, vexatious or
brought in bad faith."' The plaintiff also contended that be-
cause Section 505 was similar to the attorney's fee provision of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196423 it should be similar-
ly interpreted."
The plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court in
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, held that under Title
VII, prevailing defendants must show that the plaintiffs case
was frivolous, meritless or vexatious before being awarded
attorney's fees."' The district court noted that the Supreme
Court interpreted the legislative history of Title VII to show that
Congress intended that plaintiffs and defendants should be
treated differently with respect to attorney's fees, even though
the language of the statute did not indicate different treat-
ment.127 The district court then asserted that no similar legis-
lative history existed for Section 505." The court reasoned
that because Congress gave no indication of how to interpret the
statute, the court was bound by its plain meaning.29 The dis-
trict court rejected the Second Circuit's contention in Diamond,
that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants should be
treated differently with respect to an award of Section 505
attorney's fees."0 The district court asserted that the Second
Circuit's interpretation of the law was incorrect."' The court
concluded that because nothing in the statute or in the legisla-
tive history distinguished between prevailing plaintiffs and de-
fendants, the courts had no authority to make such a distinc-
tion. 1
3
122. Id. at 620.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. 1993). See note 14 for text of Sec-
tion 2000e-5(k).
124. Cohen, 617 F. Supp. at 621.
125. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
126. Cohen, 617 F. Supp. at 620-21.
127. Id. at 621 (citing Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420). The district court said
"it is clear that the words Congress uses in such statutes does [sic] not necessarily
convey the intent of Congress as discerned by the courts." Cohen, 617 F. Supp. at
621.
128. Id. The legislative history of Section 505 states, "[u]nder section 505 the
awarding of costs and attorney's fees are left to the court's discretion, and the sec-
tion also makes clear that neither costs nor attorney's fees can be awarded to or
against 'the United States or an officer thereof.' " H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 163 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5779.
129. Cohen, 617 F. Supp. at 623.
130. Id.




In Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc.'3 the Third Circuit also
adopted an evenhanded approach for the awarding of attorney's
fees.' Lieb addressed whether the district court abused its
discretion by denying defendants attorney's fees after it granted
summary judgment for defendants in a copyright infringement
suit.'" The plaintiff alleged copyright infringement because
the defendant had produced an audio cassette of Halloween
sounds similar to the plaintiffs tape, entitled "Haunted Hor-
ror."  Because the plaintiff admitted that the defendant did
not copy the plaintiffs tape directly, the district court granted
summary judgment to the defendant and denied an award of
attorney's fees without any explanation.137 The circuit court
remanded the case to the district court to explain the reasons for
denying attorney's fees." The Third Circuit reviewed and re-
jected the Second Circuit's reasons, articulated in Diamond, for
adopting a dual standard."9 The Third Circuit, like the Cohen
court, could not find a justification for treating the plaintiffs and
defendants differently."4 The court then held that an award of
attorney's fees should not be granted in every copyright in-
fringement case because Congress clearly gave the courts discre-
tion in making the award."
In Sherry Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Towel King of
Florida, Inc."" the Eleventh Circuit clarified its evenhanded
approach for awarding Section 505 attorney's fees. The issue in
Sherry Manufacturing was whether the district court properly
awarded attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant in a copy-
right infringement case.' The plaintiff alleged that the defen-
dant sold beach towels that incorporated the plaintiffs copy-
righted design and the district court held in favor of the plain-
tiff.'" On appeal, the circuit court reversed and remanded the
decision, ruling that the plaintiffs design was not copyright-
able. 4 On remand, the district court awarded the prevailing
133. 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986).
134. Lieb, 788 F.2d at 156.




139. Lieb, 788 F.2d at 154-55.
140. Id. at 155.
141. Id. at 155-56.
142. 822 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir. 1987).





defendant attorney's fees." The circuit court vacated this deci-
sion and again remanded the case to the district court for a
clarification of the reasoning used by the court in the decision to
award attorney's fees to the defendant."7 As guidance to the
district court, the circuit court stated that the district court had
the discretionary power to award fees to any prevailing par-
ty.' The opinion indicated that there was no requirement to
show bad faith or a frivolous suit by the losing party, but the
losing party's good faith could be considered by the court in its
decision of whether to exercise its discretion and award
attorney's fees."9 Additionally, the circuit court stated that the
only condition for the award of attorney's fees to a party should
be that the party must have prevailed."
The courts have continually struggled with their discretionary
power to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party in copyright
infringement cases. Diverging court decisions have provided
numerous reasons for awarding or denying attorney's fees. The
District Court for the Southern District of New York in 1905
denied a prevailing defendant attorney's fees in Vernon because
the plaintiffs suit was brought in good faith. 51 In 1925, the
Second Circuit upheld an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing
defendant in Marks because the statute allowed such an
award. 52 The Seventh Circuit in Official Aviation Guide up-
held the denial of an award of attorney's fees by the district
court because the case was "hard fought and prosecuted in good
faith, and it presented a complex question in law.""s In 1953,
the Ninth Circuit agreed with this reasoning in Overman and
denied attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant. 5
Then in 1963, the District Court for the Southern District of
New York created new law in Breffort. The court held that pre-
vailing defendants and prevailing plaintiffs should be treated
differently and that a prevailing defendant could only be award-
ed attorney's fees if the plaintiff's case was in bad faith, unrea-
sonable or frivolous.' No previous court had ruled in this
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Sherry Mfg., 822 F.2d at 1034.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Vernon v. Sam S. & Lee Shubert, Inc., 220 F. 694, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
152. Marks v. Leo Feist, Inc., 8 F.2d 460, 461 (2d Cir. 1925).
153. Official Aviation Guide Co. v. American Aviation Associates, Inc., 162 F.2d
541, 543 (7th Cir. 1947).
154. Overman v. Loesser, 205 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1953).
155. Breffort v. I Had A Ball Co., 271 F. Supp. 623, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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fashion." All of the previous decisions merely enumerated
some of the factors that the courts used in determining whether
an award of attorney's fees was warranted."7 However, the
Second Circuit embraced the reasoning of Breffort, in Diamond,
and the dual standard was recognized." But the reasoning of
the Second Circuit, which was the same reasoning used by the
Ninth Circuit and the argument asserted by Fantasy in Fogerty
was flawed.'59
The language of Section 505 of the Copyright Act of 1976 is
clear and unambiguous. The section authorizes the courts at
their discretion to award attorney's fees to the prevailing par-
ty.'" It does not differentiate between prevailing plaintiffs and
prevailing defendants. 1" In Negonsott v. Samuels,"6 ' the Su-
preme Court opined that in determining the meaning of a stat-
ute the Court must effectuate the will of Congress, and when
that will had been put forth in plain language, the language was
conclusive."
If the language is not clear, the courts can use legislative
history to help determine the intent of Congress. 6' But the Su-
preme Court has warned that the plain meaning of a statute
cannot be overcome by legislative history which may provide
ambiguous and dubious direction.'" The legislative history of
Section 505 does not distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs
and prevailing defendants.'" Because the language of Section
505 is clear and the legislative history does not contradict the
plain language, the Supreme Court had no choice but to follow
the plain meaning and hold that prevailing plaintiffs and pre-
vailing defendants should be treated the same and be awarded
attorney's fees at the discretion of the court. 7 This author
suggests that the Supreme Court made the proper decision given
156. See Cohen v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 622 (E.D. Va.
1985), afid on other grounds, 788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986), reu'd in part, affd in
part, Nos. 86-1164, 86-1169, 1987 WL 37512 (4th Cir. May 26, 1987).
157. Id.
158. Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d 142, 149 (2d Cir. 1984).
See notes 98-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of Diamond.
159. See Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1027.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1988). See note 7 for text of Section 505.
161. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1027.
162. 113 S. Ct. 1119 (1993).
163. Negonsott, 113 S. Ct. at 1122-23 (quoting Griffen v. Ocean Contractors,
Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)).
164. See United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 337-38 (1950). See also 82
C.J.S. Statutes § 355 (1953).
165. See Gemsco v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 260 (1945).
166. See note 128 for text of legislative history of Section 505.
167. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1033.
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the unambiguous language of the statute and the lack of any
evidence showing that Congress intended a different interpreta-
tion of the statute.
The Supreme Court did not, however, give the district courts
any clear guidelines on when they should exercise their discre-
tion in the awarding of attorney's fees in copyright infringement
suits. All the opinion accomplished was to define the boundaries
for this decision. One boundary was set by the Court when it
held that fees should not be awarded automatically, as Petition-
er Fogerty had suggested."6 The other boundary was set by
the requirement of the patent and trademark statutes which
only award attorney's fees to the prevailing party in exceptional
cases.1' The Supreme Court noted that this requirement was
in addition to what was called for by the copyright statute;17 °
consequently, the requirement should not be necessary for an
award of attorney's fees under the statute. The question then
becomes what is necessary to trigger an allowance of attorney's
fees. Must there be bad faith, unreasonableness or frivolity be-
fore an award is allowed by the court? Will a hard fought prose-
cution of a complex problem of law preclude an award of
attorney's fees as the Seventh Circuit held in Official Aviation




169. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
170. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1028 n.12.
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